Wednesday, October 21, 2026

 

Policy Proposal Idea

Primary Proposal: A "Privacy-Preserving Public Digital Infrastructure & Statutory Right to Self-Custody Act"

  • The Core Problem: Public policymakers currently oscillate between two flawed extremes: either leaving retail users exposed to unregulated, opaque offshore exchanges (like FTX), or imposing dragnet financial surveillance and pushing Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) that strip citizens of financial privacy and create centralized data "honeypots."

  • The Three-Pillar Policy Solution:

  1. Codify the Right to Self-Custody and Open-Source Node Operation: Explicitly distinguish in law between centralized custodial intermediaries (which must be strictly regulated for solvency, off-balance-sheet bankruptcy remoteness, and auditing—modeled on Switzerland’s FINMA "Crypto-Institution" and "Payment Instrument" licenses and Liechtenstein’s TVTG / Blockchain Act) and non-custodial open-source protocols and self-hosted wallets. Citizens and cooperatives must have the statutory right to hold their own cryptographic keys and run validation nodes without being treated as unlicensed money transmitters.

  2. Statutory Right to Self-Custody & Multi-Signature Architecture: Enshrine in law the right of individuals, charities, and corporations to hold digital assets in self-custodial hardware and multi-signature setups (such as 6-of-9 multi-vendor HSM architectures) and to run validation nodes, explicitly exempting non-custodial software developers and open-source protocols from financial intermediary licensing.

  3. Mandate Zero-Knowledge Compliance ("ZK-KYC" & "Know Your Agent"): Replace bulk personal-data collection with cryptographic verification. As you noted in your Zurich keynote (The Future of Payment & Tokenization on Blockchain), "public ledgers are transparent by design, which creates a privacy imperative. We must use advanced cryptography to protect trade secrets and intellectual property, prevent front-running, and avoid creating security 'honeypots'." Regulators should officially recognize Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) and Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) so citizens—and soon autonomous AI software under "KYA (Know Your Agent)"—can mathematically prove regulatory compliance (such as non-sanctioned status or tax residency) without surrendering their identity or transaction history to centralized corporate databases.

  4. Integrate Flexible-Load Mining into Public Renewable Grid Policy: Rather than blanket restrictions on Proof-of-Work, energy regulators should classify cryptographic compute and Bitcoin mining as an automated demand-response "flexible load option" to underwrite sovereign renewable microgrids and capture wasted methane flares.

  5. Democratizing Community Infrastructure (Public RWA Tokenization): Allow local councils and community land trusts to issue fractionalized, tokenized municipal bonds (in denominations as low as £10) directly to local residents to fund social housing, local transport, and cooperative enterprises—bypassing expensive City of London underwriting fees and keeping investment yields inside working-class communities.

  6. Bankruptcy-Remote Segregation for Centralized Custodians: As the UK FCA authorisation gateway (opened September 30, 2026) brings crypto exchanges and stablecoin issuers under FSMA supervision, require all centralized custodians to hold client digital assets off-balance-sheet with cryptographic Proof-of-Reserves (modeled on Switzerland’s FINMA "Crypto-Institution" license and Liechtenstein’s TVTG), making customer funds 100% bankruptcy-remote.

  7. Establish the World’s First Statutory "Know Your Agent" (KYA) Framework: Create a legal and cryptographic standard allowing UK businesses, public institutions, and cooperatives to register autonomous AI agents and robotic hardware with verifiable decentralized IDs and cryptographically bounded spending limits.



 Your perspective on crypto, its politics and the future? (2-3 minutes)

Intro:

Good evening. I’m an electronics engineer by training, and for the past fourteen years my work has focused on one question: how do we upgrade the underlying plumbing of global value transfer?


Network of information vs network of value

I view blockchain through a simple structural lens.

The internet we have used for thirty years is a "Network of Information"—a "Communications Exchange Protocol" that "Allows to send information anywhere in the world instantaneously." What Satoshi Nakamoto’s 2008 whitepaper unlocked—and what The Economist famously called "The trust machine"—is a "Network of Value": a "Value Exchange Protocol" that "Allows to transmit value anywhere in the world instantaneously" without relying on a rent-seeking intermediary.

Regulation is welcome when it enforces strict solvency and bankruptcy-remote custody on centralized intermediaries. However, regulation becomes dangerous when it confuses centralized middlemen with open-source code, or when public ledger transparency is allowed to erode citizen and corporate privacy.



Bitcoin vs bitcoin

  • Capital 'B' Bitcoin is an open, immutable, peer-to-peer settlement networkthat "invented digital scarcity without the need for trusted parties to record the ledger."

  • Small 'B' bitcoin is a scarce digital commodity—what I call "PROGRAMMABLE HARD MONEY"
    While bitcoin were introduced as a peer-to-peer electronic cash system, evolved into an antifragile store-of-value asset—digital gold secured by thermodynamic Proof-of-Work.


Now is it:Currency or an asset?

  • When people debate whether crypto is a currency or an asset, they are really observing how a new monetary standard matures.

  • Now the main difference between the currency or just the asset is its use as a medium of exchange. As much as different blockchain protocols offer different settlement times between parties, most blockchains can transact close to the speed of light.
    Bitcoins and is now scaling through Layer-2 protocols like Lightning and Zero-Knowledge proofs to serve once again as a high-velocity currency.

    For example, Bitcoin is building layer 2 protocols to support native and tokenised payments. Layer 2+ protocols sit on top of base/Bitcoin protocol  just like your SMTP mail protocol sit on top of TCP/IP portocol, Layer-2 payment channels like the Lightning Network, or through regulated stablecoins—which already exceed $214 billion to $300 billion in supply and process "35 trillion in annual volume"—the technology functions as high-velocity digital currency.







What about its politics?

As I tell students, blockchain creates "a new jurisdiction called cyberspace, and in this land is governed by code that has no value judgement and just executes valid statements and reject any and all invalid statements." While early political theory viewed blockchain purely as liberation from the state, we now face a stark fork in the road: "Digital money vs Central Bank Digital Currency." If states and commercial giants deploy programmable CBDCs and dragnet surveillance without cryptographic privacy, money becomes an instrument of social control—capable of freezing dissidents, debanking citizens without due process, and tracking every human interaction.

At its origin, "By separating state control from money and establishing self-sovereign, peer-to-peer networks, individuals gain financial independence and protection against arbitrary asset devaluation, capital controls, and overreaching regulatory enforcement." While that sounds traditionally libertarian, I have long argued that Bitcoin is "the forgotten asset in an ESG portfolio"—and one that the centre-left should examine seriously rather than cede to speculators:

  • Socially, it is a 24/7/365 public utility for "Financial Inclusion (Remittances, offering banking, savings and private property to all)", "Empowering people with no access (Eg: women of Afghanistan, refugees)" in an opt-in system that disrupts extractive remittance monopolies.

  • Environmentally, Proof-of-Work miners act "as a flexible load option" that monetizes stranded renewable energy and flared methane, "accelerating the sustainable energy adoption."

  • Politically, it forces a defining choice for the 21st century: "Digital money vs Central Bank Digital Currency"—open, participatory public rails where citizens retain self-sovereignty, versus programmable state surveillance money.


And what of the long-term future?

Whether we are stabilizing Earth’s climate with renewable microgrids, coordinating autonomous AI agents under a shared rules-based covenant, or eventually transacting beyond Earth where physical gold and paper cannot travel, open cryptographic protocols are how humanity scales trust without scaling bureaucracy. The challenge for policymakers today is to stop fighting the last century’s war and start harnessing these protocols for the public good."

Public blockchains are transparent by design, which creates an urgent privacy imperative. In my recent work at pew256, we emphasize that "Cryptography is a defensive tool." The future of a free digital society depends on deploying Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs), Self-Sovereign Identity, and multi-signature self-custody—tools that allow individuals and institutions to prove they are playing by the rules mathematically, without surrendering their autonomy or creating centralized data honeypots."



Because we are entering an era where AI agents and autonomous machines do not just assist humans—they autonomously manage workflows, logistics, energy grids, and compute. A delivery drone, an autonomous EV, or an enterprise AI agent cannot walk into a High Street bank branch with a passport to open a checking account


Wednesday, October 28, 2020

A PCC is a single legal entity which may create one or more protected cells for the purpose of segregating and protecting cellular and core assets as provided under the Companies Law.


Legal Segregation of Assets and Liabilities

The key principle of a PCC is that, where any liability arises which is attributable to a particular cell or to the core, only the cellular assets attributable to that cell or the core assets attributable to the core, should be used in satisfaction of the liability. Thus, when considering a liability attributable to a cell, the core assets and the assets attributable to any other cell are “protected assets”.


In the absence of a recourse agreement, creditors of a cell of a PCC only have recourse against the cellular assets attributable to that cell and those cellular assets are absolutely protected from the creditors of another cell. Similarly, unless a recourse agreement stipulates otherwise, the core assets of the core of a PCC are only available to creditors of the core and are absolutely protected from any creditors of any cell who are not creditors of the core. Liabilities of a PCC not otherwise attributable to any of its cells must be discharged from the PCC’s core assets.


Unless excluded in writing, it is an implied term of every transaction to which a PCC is party that no party shall make or attempt to make liable any “protected assets”. The Companies Law sets out recovery mechanisms in favour of the PCC should any such party be successful in taking protected assets in satisfaction of liabilities. The principle is that, subject to the terms of any recourse agreement, the cellular assets attributable to a cell must be used in satisfaction of any liability attributable to that cell. In the same way, the assets attributable to the core are liable in respect of liabilities attributable to the core.


Recourse Agreements

A recourse agreement is a written agreement between a PCC and a creditor which provides that protected assets may be subject to a liability owed to a creditor. The Companies Law provides that a PCC may only enter into a recourse agreement if the directors have followed certain procedures and, subject to the articles of incorporation of the PCC (“the Articles”), if the core members or the members of the relevant cell (as appropriate) have agreed the recourse agreement.


Separation of Cell and Core Assets

The directors of a PCC structure must keep cellular assets separate and separately identifiable from the core assets and must also keep cellular assets attributable to each cell separate and separately identifiable from cellular assets attributable to other cells. Nonetheless, the assets of a PCC may be collectively invested, provided that they remain separately identifiable. The assets of a PCC may also be held by a nominee or underlying company, the capital of which forms cellular assets or core assets (as the case may be).


Informing Third Parties

A PCC must inform any person with whom it transacts that it is a PCC and identify or specify the cell in respect of which that person is transacting or specify that the transaction is in respect of the core (as appropriate). If a PCC fails to provide the transacting party with this information, the directors of the PCC become personally liable to the counterparty to the contract, although, unless they were fraudulent, reckless, negligent or acted in bad faith, they do have a right of indemnity against the core assets of the PCC. Only the Court can relieve the directors from this indemnity on certain grounds set out in the Companies Law and, in doing so, may order that any liability may be met from the cellular assets or core assets of the PCC.


Transfer of Assets Out of a Cell

Cellular assets may not be transferred out of the relevant cell other than in the ordinary course of business. The exception to this is where the Court approves the transfer of assets out of a cell (but not the core) to another person, wherever resident or incorporated. This transfer mechanism is not intended to cover the investment or divestment by the cell of cellular assets or a payment or transfer from cellular assets in the ordinary course of business. Such ordinary course transactions would not require Court approval.


The Court will only approve a transfer of cellular assets if it is satisfied that the creditors of the cell concerned have consented to the transfer or would not be unfairly prejudiced by the transfer.


The Commission has a right to make representations to the Court in respect of the transfer. A transfer can be approved by the Court even though the PCC is being wound up or it or any of its cells is subject to an order for receivership or administration.


Arrangements between Cells

A PCC may, in the ordinary course of its business or the business attributable to any of its cells, make an arrangement where it deals, transfers, disposes or attributes cellular assets or core assets between any of its cells or between the PCC and any of its cells. If necessary, the PCC must adjust its accounting records and those of the affected cells to reflect the new arrangement. The PCC itself, its liquidators or administrators, or the receiver or administrator of any cell, may apply to the Court to make an order to vary, rescind, replace or confirm in respect of the execution, administration or enforcement of an arrangement. 


Winding Up

In a winding up, the cells of a PCC remain separate and the liquidator must apply a cell’s assets only to those creditors entitled to have recourse against them. The general rule that a company’s assets must be applied in satisfaction of the company’s debts and liabilities pari passu is modified to apply to PCCs subject to the provisions of the Companies Law relating to PCCs.


Administration Orders

An administration order may be granted by the Court in respect of a PCC or any one or more of its cells if the Court is satisfied that the PCC (or cell) does not satisfy or is likely to become unable to satisfy the solvency test as prescribed by the Companies Law, and if the Court considers that the making of an administration order may achieve one or more of the following: • the survival of the PCC or cell (as the case may be) and the whole or any part of its undertaking as a going concern; or a more advantageous realisation of the assets of the PCC or the cell (as the case may be) than would be effected on a winding up. 


Administration implements a court sanctioned moratorium against resolutions for the winding up of a PCC and on the commencement or continuance of proceedings against the PCC (without the leave of the Court) during the period between the application and the making of the actual administration order. The moratorium continues once the administration order has been granted but does not affect rights of set-off and secured interests.


An administrator is empowered to do all such things as may be necessary or expedient for the management of the affairs, business and property of the PCC or cell. Upon his appointment, the administrator must take into his custody or control all of the property to which the PCC or cell appears entitled. The administrator must also manage the affairs, business and property of the PCC or cell in accordance with any directions given by the Court. The administrator can remove and appoint directors. Neither an application for administration, nor the subsequent order for administration, results in a statutory cessation of the powers and responsibilities of the directors.


However, any functions conferred on the PCC of its officers constitutionally or by the Companies Law which could be performed in a way which interferes with the administrator’s functions, may not be performed unless the administrator gives his consent.


If an application has been made for the winding up of the PCC, or if the PCC has passed a resolution for voluntary winding up, an administration order in respect of a cell of a PCC may not be made if a liquidator has been appointed to act in respect of the PCC.


An administration order ceases to have effect when a liquidator is appointed. A resolution for the voluntary winding up of a PCC or any cell, which is subject to an administration order, can only be made with the approval of the Court.


Receivership Orders

A receivership order may be made by the Court in respect of one or more cells of a PCC where: • taking account of any assets subject to a recourse agreement, the cellular assets attributable to a particular cell are or are likely to be insufficient to discharge the creditor’s claims in respect of that cell; • the making of an administration order in respect of that cell would not be appropriate; and • the making of an order would achieve the orderly winding up of the business of that cell and the distribution of the cellular assets to those who would have recourse against them.


During the continuance of a receivership order, the powers and responsibilities of the directors cease. There is a Court sanctioned moratorium during the operation of a receivership order against resolutions for the winding up of the PCC and on the commencement or continuance of proceedings against the relevant cell of the PCC (save with the leave of the Court). The moratorium does not affect the rights of set-off and secured creditors. A receivership order may be made in respect of a cell which is subject to an administration order. The PCC, its directors, any creditor of a cell, a cell Holder, an administrator of a cell or the Commission may apply for a receivership order. Notice must be served on the PCC, any administrator of the cell, the Commission and any other person the Court may direct.


Subject to rules on preferential payments, any subordination agreements and any set-off agreements, the PCC’s cellular assets which are the subject of a receivership order must be realised and applied pari passu. Any surplus must be distributed to investors or persons so entitled. If there are no such persons, it must be distributed amongst the holders of the core assets in accordance with their respective rights and interests.


A receivership order in respect of a cell of a PCC may not be made if a liquidator has been appointed to act in respect of the PCC or if the PCC has passed a resolution for voluntary winding up.